Nietzsche on Agency and the Will
Here is the problem: there are several passages in Nietzsche that make it seem as though agency is an illusion and has no causal force whatsoever. However, many philosophers of action would be at threat if this were true, since you need an agent in order to have genuine actions (as opposed to mere happenings). Although the passages that I will discuss from Nietzsche bring our conception of agency and personal volition into question, I believe that they do not have to be read as arguing that agency is an epiphenomenon; they do not have to be read as saying that the will is a mere illusion without causal force. Instead, I believe that Nietzsche has a positive conception of both agency and the will. I believe he must have a robust picture of agency in order to believe that a re-evaluation of values is possible. Without an agent that can operate with values and reasons for acting, a re-evaluation of those values would be futile.
In this article, I seek to show that Nietzsche has a conception of agency with causal efficacy. Toward this end, I will begin my article by (I) quoting several passages in Nietzsche that appear to be advocating that agency is an illusion and that the will is causally ineffective. Then I will (II) argue that what Nietzsche wants to do is offer a weaker (yet more sophisticated) conception of agency. Next, I will (III) re-examine those passages (from section I) in a broader context to show how they should actually be read as advocating the opposite of their initial, superficial reading. I will re-examine them to show that Nietzsche believes agency exists and that the will is causally effective. I argue that instead of dismissing agency and the will, all Nietzsche is trying to do in those passages is advise us with a few qualifications (e.g., the subject exists, but not a neutral subject; the will is causal, but not causa sui). Finally, I will (IV) give some direct textual evidence for Nietzsche’s belief in agency and the causality of the will.
